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cybernetics as it develops, and it is these concepts 
that give cybernetics its continuing relevance in 
contemporary design discussions. Conversation 
and circularity are complex and rewarding, but it 
is the simpler message-in, message-out version 
of information that is dominant in how most people 
think about information, and this is reinforced in the 
design of many of our technologies.
One place this contrast is particularly clear is 
Pask’s ‘The Limits of Togetherness’.1 There he 
sharply differentiates conversation and communica-
tion (in the sense of message transmission): 
Communication and conversation are distinct, and 
they do not always go hand in hand. Suppose that 
communication is liberally construed as the transmis-
sion and transformation of signals. If so, conversation 
requires at least some communication. But, enigmati-
cally perhaps, very bad communication may admit 
very good conversation and the existence of a perfect 
channel is no guarantee that any conversation will 
take place.2
What I love about Gordon Pask’s conversation 
theory is that it explains a way for achieving agree-
ment that maintains (and requires) the differences 
between participants to be maintained. When we 
think of communication in terms of the passing 
and receiving of messages, then we try to equate 
what is heard with what is said. Communication 
as message transmission is thus conservative, in 
that it aims to minimise new understanding from 
arising. It can also be violent, in that the listener’s 
In this article Jon Goodbun and Ben Sweeting 
engage in a conversation about design and its 
complex relation to communication. Their dialogue 
was prompted by the following question from this 
issue’s editors: 
If one approaches cybernetics as the study of infor-
mation processes, the focus is no longer only on 
digital logics, but rather on the production, exchange 
and consumption of meaning. In other words, cyber-
netisation can set forward a relational account that 
focuses on how ‘asignifying signs’ are produced and 
exchanged within complex systems of any kind. As 
such, is it possible to understand the contemporary 
processes of cybernetisation as a way of ridding archi-
tecture of the linguistic burdens of its past? Moreover, 
in what ways can this shift in architectural logics be 
related to the political and ethical questions confronted 
by architects grappling with the complexities of ecolog-
ical crises?
Ben Sweeting: I think we might begin with just the 
first part of the editors’ prompt. Information is a good 
place to start with cybernetics, but there are multiple 
conceptions of ‘information’ in relation to cyber-
netics, and it is helpful to pull these apart. 
I think it is conventional to think of information 
in the sense of the content of messages. This is the 
context of Shannon’s information theory, which is 
closely aligned with initial developments in cyber-
netics, with its focus on communication. However, 
message transmission is very different to the notions 
of conversation and circularity that are at the core of 
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by Extinction Rebellion in their assemblies, and of 
course that there are all kinds of parallels in various 
anarcho-leftist participatory democratic practices.5 
I have been thinking about dialogic structures as 
a part of an outline of an environmental semiotics 
that include human and other actors, signifying and 
asignifying signs, both as a tool for understanding 
ecological interactions, and also as a tool for 
thinking about a kind of dialogic or conversational 
‘ecological planning’. I have been using dialogue as 
a way of approaching Green New Deal thinking, for 
example.
It is interesting to bring Bateson into this conver-
sation too. So of course, Bateson experimented 
with the conversational form as a rhetorical tool and 
explanatory device in his ‘metalogues’. And working 
with bringing multiple perspectives together (which 
I think is one of the things at stake in Pask’s model 
of conversation) was always a key method for him, 
going right back to his early anthropological work 
Naven, which was the study of the meaning of a 
particular ceremony from ‘three points of view’. 
There is something fundamentally polyphonic and 
multi-perspectival in the work of Pask and Bateson, 
and more generally in what I think of as the radical 
tendency within cybernetics. We find here a recog-
nition of the need to hold multiple points of view 
together in a properly dialectical tension. This is 
very useful for us today in thinking about ecological 
systems and our interactions and conversations 
with them, but also in thinking about the kinds of 
democratic and decision-making processes that we 
might need going forwards… 
Bateson defined information as ‘a difference 
that makes a difference’, that is, you always need 
something or someone that is sensitive to a given 
difference in a field, and to recognise it as such. 
There is always a context and an observing system. 
Furthermore, he then saw learning, evolution, and 
biological morphology as fundamentally intercon-
nected and isomorphic processes. He would state 
for example that
meaning is to be reduced to that of the speaker’s 
intention. Conversation, by contrast, is something 
that welcomes new meanings and requires us to 
adopt the standpoints of others. I find this concep-
tion of conversation makes sense of Pask’s various 
contributions to architecture, and it is also helpful in 
articulating what is so special about what designers 
do.3 Another important conception of information 
in cybernetics is that of Gregory Bateson. Bateson 
also associates information with difference, but in a 
different way and context to Pask.
Jon Goodbun: That is a wonderful quote! Pask’s 
conception of conversation is an important one, and 
there are a few things that it makes me want to bring 
into this conversation here. I am immediately thinking 
about the work of the very interesting theoretical 
physicist David Bohm around dialogue.4 Bohm’s 
thought does not easily fit into a classic cybernetic 
account, but he was very much a systems-theoretic 
thinker.  Bohm reminds us that there is an impor-
tant distinction between discussion and dialogue. 
Discussion shares a common root with words like 
percussion, and basically means to break things up. 
So maybe discussion describes a message trans-
mission in a reductive mode, of breaking things 
up for analysis, and so on. Dialogue has a very 
different meaning. It is funny, in that we often have 
an internal mistranslation of dialogue, thinking that 
the ‘dia’ means two and imagining that dialogue 
therefore means between two people, but that is 
not the case. Actually, it means ‘through the word’, 
and for Bohm it suggested a mode of communica-
tion much closer to Pask’s account of conversation, 
in that in dialogue there is a more ‘ecological’ flow of 
meaning between, through and around participants. 
There is a sense that the dialogue itself, the conver-
sation, has a degree of internal autonomy and a 
more holistic coherence beyond the ‘intentions’ of 
any individual speech act.
It is interesting, I think, to also note that forms 
of dialogue – often directly referencing some of the 
Bohmian Dialogue techniques – has been adopted 
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something – ideas for their design projects, say. 
They might present this to their tutors and to each 
other. At the same time, maybe the tutors have 
something they need to get across – perhaps 
some different interpretation of the project or some 
idea about which direction to develop the design. 
Neither party can just pass their meaning on. The 
listeners build their own understanding of what 
the speakers understand. To check how well they 
have understood, they might well ask something 
like ‘do you mean like this?’ By listening to how the 
others respond, one can get a sense of whether 
you have been understood. But it is not like you are 
comparing your understanding to that of others – 
instead, you compare your understanding of what 
you are trying to share to your understanding of 
others’ understanding of your understanding. This 
reflexivity explains how we can coordinate action 
as if we understand the same thing, while main-
taining the differences between how and what we 
understand. As well as avoiding the need for the 
sort of questionable assumptions required by a 
code-decode model, I find this is an ethically and 
politically desirable way to work with others. Indeed, 
to ‘turn about with’ (conversation) originally had the 
meaning of living with or even dwelling.
There is plenty more in conversation theory, 
but this basic process is the part that Ranulph 
Glanville would always focus on, using it to bring 
design and cybernetics into close relation.7 I find 
that it is helpful in the context of other conversa-
tional frameworks in thinking through the underlying 
mechanism, and also in teaching, where it reminds 
me that I am not trying to get students to have the 
same understanding I have (which would be a form 
of reducing difference). I find it is often productive 
when students see things in what I say that I did not 
anticipate and vice versa. ‘Do you mean like this…?’ 
might be a confirmation, but it is often something 
that one had not meant, creating new connections, 
questions, and insights. This way my students do 
things that are beyond what I can do or explain. 
So, it is not just that conversation does not reduce 
whatever the word ‘story’ means … the fact of thinking 
in terms of stories does not isolate human beings as 
something separate from the starfish and the sea 
anemones, the coconut palms and the primroses. 
Rather, if the world be connected, if I am at all funda-
mentally right in what I am saying, then thinking in 
terms of stories must be shared by all mind or minds 
whether ours or those of redwood forests and sea 
anemones. 
Context and relevance must be characteristic not 
only of all so-called behavior (those stories which 
are projected out into ‘action’), but also of all those 
internal stories, the sequences of the building up of 
the sea anemone. Its embryology must be somehow 
made of the stuff of stories. And behind that, again, the 
evolutionary process through millions of generations 
whereby the sea anemone, like you and me, came to 
be – that process, too, must be of the stuff of stories. 
There must be relevance in every step of phylogeny 
and among the steps.6
BS: That is a great way of distinguishing dialogue 
from mere discussion, and relevant to our time. With 
the pandemic moving so much online, it is easier 
than ever to end up passing messages rather than 
conversing. I think part of the reason we often think 
of dialogue in terms of two participants is that in it 
every participant is always moving between two 
modes – speaking (adding content) and listening 
(building understanding of the content introduced 
by others). If we only do one, we obstruct dialogue. 
This is obvious when someone speaks but does not 
listen, but I think it is also the case when someone 
listens but does not speak or passively agrees, as 
then they are not offering something new to others. 
The etymology of conversation is to ‘turn about with’ 
– which I think of as continually turning between 
listening and speaking (and their equivalents).
For me, the important bit of Pask’s conversa-
tion theory is how it explains how we can act as if 
we understand the same thing without requiring us 
to reduce one understanding to the other. Imagine 
students trying to explain how they understand 
158
understanding the environmental crisis, because he 
saw that the environmental crisis had a significant 
epistemological component: our conscious purpose 
necessarily works on the basis of selective repre-
sentations, or maps of the world, and we export the 
simplicity and reduced variety of our maps, now 
amplified by technology, back out into our worlds.
The core of the paradox of consciousness is that 
it is unable to see its own conditions of production 
(or at least, not directly, as an object of conscious-
ness). Furthermore, we tend to experience the 
productions of consciousness as the totality of our 
mental processes. But of course, they are nothing 
of the kind. Bateson sometimes liked to describe 
this in terms of arcs and loops, where we might think 
of our sense of self situated both as, and within, 
extended entanglements of looping eco-mental 
relationships. However, the screen of conscious-
ness only perceives small sections of arcs of these 
looping relations. Bateson described – and we 
need to forgive him his pronouns here – three inter-
acting levels to these ecosystems, something that 
Félix Guattari would develop further in The Three 
Ecologies.12 Still, as Bateson claims:
On the one hand, we have the systemic nature of 
the individual human being, the systemic nature of 
the culture in which he lives, and the systemic nature 
of the biological, ecosystem around him; and on the 
other hand, the curious twist in the systemic nature of 
the individual man whereby consciousness is, almost 
of necessity, blinded to the systemic nature of the man 
himself. Purposive consciousness pulls out, from the 
total mind, sequences which do not have the loop 
structure which is characteristic of the whole systemic 
structure.13 
This tendency of modern human consciousness to 
not perceive its part-of-a-system character, to not 
recognise that what it sees as small linear chains of 
(signifying) relationships are always also participants 
in much bigger webs of (asignifying) relationships, 
is not necessarily a problem, as consciousness is 
difference, it is driven by difference and produces it.
The role of participant (in conversation theory: 
psychological individual, or p-individual) is quite flex-
ible for Pask – it does not necessarily correspond 
to the ways in which we are embodied (mechanical 
individual, or m-individual). I can talk with myself, 
moving between two or more participant positions, 
or a whole group of people, say an institution, might 
act as one participant in a conversation. When Pask 
worked with Nicholas Negroponte on machine intel-
ligence, his focus was on whether the dialogue 
‘manifests understanding’, which is a quality of 
the interaction rather than a comment on the 
knowledgeability of the participants.8 Many of the 
algorithmic technologies we call smart show little in 
the way of understanding – and I can think of plenty 
of human-to-human interactions that have similar 
shortcomings.9 Perhaps, coming back to Bateson, 
something similar might be said of how humans 
have interacted with their environment?
JG: Yes, I think you have captured it beautifully 
there when you state that ‘it’s not just that conversa-
tion doesn’t reduce difference, it’s driven by it and 
produces it’. This captures the difference between 
a conversation and control in our relationships with 
our environments. We know from Ashby’s Law of 
Requisite Variety that control systems will reduce 
difference and complexity in the systems that they 
control if they lack the same levels of complexity, 
and the conversational model provides a much 
more open basis for proceeding.10 
Bateson found Pask’s work on this very inter-
esting and invited him to his conference in 1968 at 
Burg Wartenstein on ‘Effects of Conscious Purpose 
on Human Adaptation’.11 This was an event which 
was precisely concerned with thinking about 
whether we can change and adapt our ways of 
thinking, planning, and perceiving, and which was 
framed by the then strongly emerging evidence of 
anthropogenic environmental crisis. For Bateson, 
the question of what he called human ‘conscious 
purpose’, of planning basically, was key to 
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that to mind/matter, nature/culture and other 
dualisms) out of languages that have the subject-
predicate structure. It is also worth noting that there 
are interesting parallels with David Bohm’s thoughts 
on language here. Not all languages have this 
structure, and Bohm of course played with ideas of 
a ‘rheomode’ – a process-based language without 
nouns – and even connected with some languages 
(notably Blackfoot) that did not have this struc-
ture, while at the 1968 conference on ‘Effects of 
Conscious Purpose on Human Adaptation’ Bateson 
also invited Anatol W. Holt, who had made himself 
a car bumper sticker which boldly stated ‘STAMP 
OUT NOUNS!’
Returning to the question of an environmental 
semiotics, we can now approach it from a slightly 
different direction, using one of Bateson’s last 
papers, ‘Men are Grass’.15 Bateson notes that a 
‘rational’ subject-predicate language tends to have 
a prose character, and a linear structuring of logical 
relations, and in its purest mode takes the form of 
the so-called Barbara syllogism: Socrates is a man 
/ Men die / Socrates will die. This is the structure 
of deductive logic, or rather, it is deductive if you 
read it top to bottom, and maybe inductive if you 
read it in the other direction. He suggests that we 
can formalise another kind of logic, abduction, 
which is closer to poetic metaphor, and for which 
he constructs the ‘men are grass’ syllogism: Men 
die / Grass dies / Men are grass. Here, there are 
no subject-object relations, just correspondences 
between predicates, between actions, between 
verbs. It is a verb-based logic! It is an abductive 
logic and, crucially, this is the logic that I think might 
in fact be more useful in thinking about asignifying 
relations. 
Now, if we compare the two syllogisms, we can 
see that the deductive syllogism identifies subjects 
and a hierarchy of classes. There is the class of 
mortals. There is the class of men. And there is the 
subject Socrates who is in the class of men, which 
is in the class of mortals. The grass syllogism is very 
different in kind. It does not identify the classes and 
only one of the forms of mental relations that we 
participate in. It is not that we should consider 
consciousness to necessarily be a bad move! But 
we should attend to its context, its ecology, its rela-
tion to various other forms of cognition, language, 
and communication, its social and technical produc-
tion,  and how easily it can slip into what Bateson 
sometimes referred to as ‘epistemological error’ 
(and only then can we engage in the personal/
political/ecological project of really exploring the 
potential productions of consciousness).
Now, if we ask ‘What kinds of processes is 
consciousness involved in?’ we tend to think (argh!) 
of particular kinds of symbolic manipulation, that is, 
particular kinds of language and particular kinds of 
logical reasoning. In fact, we are talking about digital 
processes, that is to say, processes that have the 
possibility of negation. But this is only a small part of 
a much wider field of analogic semiotic processes – 
a field which approximately corresponds to the field 
of asignifying signs that the Footprint editors refer to 
in the opening question. 
Bateson repeatedly pointed out that music, 
poetry and the creative arts provide practices that 
involve much more than conscious mind, stating for 
example that ‘in creative art man must experience 
himself – his total self – as a cybernetic model’.14 
His understanding of aesthetic experience and his 
later attempts to produce what I think we could 
call a post-religious conception of ‘the sacred’ are, 
I think, a really interesting attempt to make avail-
able to modern consciousness an experience of our 
extended ecological (analogue, asignifying) condi-
tion as a relation to our narrower (signifying, digital) 
conscious condition. On the one hand there is the 
question of conscious purpose and the relation 
of consciousness to a particular kind of language 
that is structured around a subject and object (or 
subject and predicate) and particular kind of attitude 
towards objects and environments. In fact, Bateson 
suggests in the introductory essay to Steps to an 
Ecology of Mind that maybe we produce the form/
substance dualism (and implicitly we can extend 
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be no problem in either of these. Restrictive control 
is helpful in driving a car and there can be value 
in being out of control, for instance when you want 
to generate new possibilities.19 But think of a river 
that has been constrained through engineering to 
suit human purposes. Sometimes it pushes back, 
flooding, escaping the constraints that have been 
put on its variety. We are not usually prepared for 
this, trusting in our ability to restrict the environment. 
There are approaches to regulation and coordi-
nation that are not restrictive. Glanville used the 
example of skiing – ‘the sort of control that allows 
us to stay upright when skiing, stable in the face 
of perturbations’.20 The point is not that we need 
to avoid engineering rivers but that there are ways 
of doing so that accommodate for the variety of 
the river rather than attempting to reduce it. This 
approach is to see the river and its ecosystem as 
a partner.
Another example is when education is thought 
of as a transfer of knowledge – communication 
not conversation – and the understanding of the 
students is restricted to that of the teacher. One 
of the things I love about architectural education 
is its potential to be radically different to this. It is 
the students who prepare for (most) studio teaching 
sessions, making drawings and models, and tutors 
take the position of learners, trying to understand 
what the students have done and respond to this. 
When it is working well, the students are actually 
teaching themselves (requisite variety!). The tutors 
are creating and managing the context in which 
this is possible by helping manage the variety 
the students grapple with – adding in ideas and 
considerations to expand the conversation (‘have 
you thought about this…?’, ‘tell me more about 
that…’), making things explicit so that they can be 
remembered (‘do you see what you did there...?’), 
and acting as constraint and support so the whole 
thing keeps on track (‘don’t worry about that yet…’, 
‘you need to rethink this…’, ‘let me help you with 
this bit…’). However, the expectation of expertise 
can be hard to escape. It is easy for conversation to 
subjects of a sentence. It instead identifies predi-
cates: this thing that dies is equal to this other thing 
that dies; it is, if you like, a process-based logic. 
Bateson then goes on to make a fascinating claim, 
which is that just as the deductive syllogism refers 
to subjects – it performs a signifying languaging of 
human conscious subjectivity – in the abductive 
‘men are grass’ syllogism we find a formal model 
upon which the rest of the human, and indeed 
the rest of the ecosystem works. Moreover, as an 
instance of asignifying sympoiesis and biosemiotics, 
Bateson states that ‘metaphor was not just pretty 
poetry, it was not either good or bad logic, but was in 
fact the logic on which the biological world had been 
built, the main characteristic and organising glue of 
this world of mental process’.16 It is an extraordinary 
claim, which sets out two very different structures of 
relationships with and within environments.17
BS: You mention the difference between control and 
conversation, and I wonder whether we can think of 
the different structures of relationship with the envi-
ronment in terms of different attitudes to variety and 
control. Many writers interpret cybernetics in terms 
of communication and control – going from the 
subtitle of Norbert Wiener’s book.18 Like the discus-
sion of communication above, I think cybernetics 
is interested in control, but it is not necessarily 
in favour of it; control is something to unpick and 
critique, it raises cybernetic questions rather than 
answers them. For instance, we often speak of 
the variety of the controller and controlled, but in a 
circular system this is arbitrary (the heater controls 
the thermostat as well as vice versa). I try to think of 
the variety of the relationship, which has a different 
sort of politics to it.
If there is a mismatch in variety between the 
participants in a system, the participant with the 
greatest variety will either have its variety reduced 
(restrictive control) or be out of control to some 
extent from the perspective of other participants (the 
relationship lacks coordination, from that perspec-
tive at least). Depending on the context, there may 
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‘The Dynamics of Ecological Crisis’, that Bateson 
produces to describe the inter-connection of these 
three amplifying circuits: population, technology 
and hubris.23 From the diagram it is easy to imagine 
that the three components have a similar structural 
character, but actually I wonder if they are rather 
different. The ‘population’, I think, stands for growth 
in general, the regenerative and growth tendency 
of any living system which always has the poten-
tial to go into runaway positive feedback. Otherwise 
they would not maintain themselves at all. However, 
within any relatively stable and homeostatic ecology, 
there are negative feedback loops that act to regu-
late positive loops in any given ecological network. 
We then have two other loops in that diagram, tech-
nology and hubris. Regarding technology, Bateson 
states that
what worries me is the addition of modern technology 
to the old system. Today the purposes of conscious-
ness are implemented by more and more effective 
machinery, transportation systems, airplanes, weap-
onry, medicine, pesticides and so forth. Conscious 
purpose is now empowered to upset the balance of 
body, of society, and of the biological world around 
us.24 
Of the three, the one that he thought that we could 
change and work on, and the one that I guess he 
thought that he could contribute some work on, was 
hubris. This directly connects to what we have been 
discussing, as this concept of hubris is, as you say, 
about a certain stance regarding control, which itself 
is related to the questions of consciousness and 
language. In fact, I think we can define the hubris 
here precisely in relation to some of the concepts 
that we have now set out. Hubris uses the narrow 
signifying structures of the deductive syllogism 
alone, whereas an ecological systemic wisdom 
includes thinking through the asignifying syllogism 
in grass. It is important to note, I think, that it is not 
about replacing signifying, deductive reasoning, 
but rather finding a modern ecological aesthetics 
deteriorate into communication, with the result that 
students’ variety (and that of their work) is reduced 
to that of their tutors.
Bateson identified three self-reinforcing drivers 
of the environmental crisis: population, technology, 
and what he called ‘hubris’ – our tendency to view 
the environment and each other as separate to us, 
and so in terms of competition rather than part-
nership.21 Hubris becomes manifest in all sorts of 
things: the way we bend (straighten) rivers to our 
will and the way we think of things like education 
as a linear process of imparting knowledge. We 
often think of sustainability in architecture in terms 
of Bateson’s first two causes. We build more build-
ings as the needs of population increase, and this 
enables further growth. We try to balance this out 
by reducing the waste and pollution caused by 
the building industry (technology), reorganising 
construction processes to be less wasteful and 
polluting, making buildings more energy efficient 
and less environmentally destructive. I think archi-
tecture has the potential to do more than mitigate 
the harm it causes; it can also act on our hubris. 
When we build buildings, we are articulating the 
relationship we have with the environment. Much of 
the architecture we build today separates us, rein-
forcing our hubris in the process. It has been one 
traditional role of architecture to articulate our rela-
tionship with the world and maybe this is a role that 
can be reinvented for our times.
JG: Architecture both separates and connects, 
creates interiorities and externalities and these 
spaces and structures are our extended bodies and 
our extended minds, individually and collectively. If 
thinkers like George Lakoff and Mark Johnson are in 
any way correct in thinking that significant aspects 
of human signifying languages are always also 
metaphors of our bodily spatial relations, then there 
is an important sense in which architecture trans-
forms the possibilities for thinking and languaging.22 
It is a vehicle through which asignifying signs start 
signifying perhaps. And yes, that curious diagram, 
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when we wish to explore the relationship between 
conscious thought and other processes of computa-
tion, the deep reasoning of a body or an ecosystem, 
we need to know the differences in the way they 
compute. Biological systems in general compute 
analogically, with pattern, while the conscious mind 
has access to digital processes, including the possi-
bility of negation … at whatever level it is in your mind 
that the operators are stored ... at that level there is 
no not … so that if you represent the Body and Blood 
with the bread and the wine, that level of your brain 
is just not concerned with saying that wine is wine … 
[and] not the Blood. The Catholic view of the sacra-
ment, which asserts an identity between the wine and 
the Blood, is the way that level of your mind functions. 
If you become a Protestant and protest that the wine 
has no corpuscles in it, you are talking, from a Catholic 
point of view, complete nonsense. On the other hand, 
you are making a wide statement about the nature of 
man and about yourself – namely, you are asserting, 
as a Protestant, ‘I am going to handle my religion 
totally at a conscious level.’ This excludes from your 
religion about three-quarters of yourself, because you 
aren’t all at the conscious level, and you create, in fact, 
a secular religion.26
I am always trying to find ways to teach this kind 
of ecosystemic thinking, or better still, to ask how 
can ecosystemic learning happen? Which I think is 
something that interests many of us. Ben, I know 
that your deep understanding of Pask’s conversa-
tional cybernetics has helped to shape an innovative 
piece of design research thinking in the School of 
Architecture in Brighton. I have been fortunate to 
see this emerge while I have been external exam-
iner there, and it really is an interesting piece of work 
that the students are clearly finding very useful, and 
which resonates in various ways with some of the 
things we have said.
BS: I remember Mary Catherine Bateson saying 
that the time to learn cybernetics is not at univer-
sity but in kindergarten.27 It is foundational. When 
that can play the role that – in some cases at least 
– poetry, art, religion were able to play in some non-
modern cultures, as forms of thought that were able 
to provide ‘a pattern that connects’ the loops that 
purposive conscious reasoning alone breaches.25
Therefore, we find ourselves today in a double 
bind: we need to use our conscious purpose to 
get us out of the mess that our conscious purpose 
has fed. And this is a bigger political question of 
course, as consciousness is socially produced. 
Which leads back to the editors’ opening question 
in some important ways. We are in an ecological 
crisis that is in part a product of our non-ecological 
conscious purpose, of our signifying practices; but 
the way forward cannot simply be backwards. It 
is not, I would say, going to be found in a retreat 
into asignifying practices alone, as some contem-
porary theorists seem to suggest. Rather, we need 
to find a way to move through the relation between 
signifying and asignifying practices, to situate 
and embody conscious purpose within ecological 
wisdom. This is very important not just conceptu-
ally, but also in response to the kind of ecological 
planning now being called for in a just response to 
the climate emergency, in for example the emerging 
dialogue around a Global Green New Deal. Rather 
than asking whether architecture might be rid of its 
linguistic burdens, maybe we can ask: How might 
a properly environmental architecture extend a 
scaffolding, and afford metaphors, for a plurivocal 
ecological conversation that transverses signifying 
and asignifying registers? 
There is a nice example that Bateson uses a 
few times, which, in his typically oblique way, gives 
us some useful clues for a more ecological thought 
and experience, and an understanding of movement 
between signifying and asignifying signs – a direct 
experience of metaphors. It concerns the differ-
ence in the experience of the eucharist between 
Catholics and Protestants. Mary Catherine Bateson 
introduces and then quotes him discussing this at 
the 1968 conference:
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For instance, which standpoint am I researching 
from and what aspects of the situation does this 
make it easier or harder to see?30 In the first weeks 
we set everyday activities, such as cooking a meal 
together that no-one in the group has cooked before 
or choosing a restaurant in a group of people you do 
not know very well. Because these activities involve 
new relations and experiences, both about food and 
about each other, it is possible to locate questions 
about research and design within these experi-
ences. What did you need to find out? How did you 
do this? What was it about your source material that 
made you trust it? Is there a difference between 
describing this activity as design rather than 
research or vice versa? What didn’t you consider 
and what difference did this make? The everyday 
activities create shared experiences that then help 
situate and internalise questions about method 
and theory before students move on to examine 
and critique their own present and past work. Our 
conversation is making me think of this exercise a 
bit like the metalogues in Steps to an Ecology of 
Mind, in the way that the rest of the book calls back 
to insights that were already developed in those 
conversations. I find myself wondering whether a 
similar approach might work for other topics. There 
is certainly a difference between receiving an expla-
nation of how some ecological system works (a 
communication pedagogy) and coming to under-
stand ecological principles by examining one’s own 
participation in them.
JG: Nice! I think that cooking a meal together in 
the context of architectural and ecological educa-
tion, research, and designing research is a beautiful 
way to ‘set forward a relational account that focuses 
on how “asignifying signs” are produced and 
exchanged within complex systems of any kind’. 
Reading back over what has been said, it feels like 
there is another meta conversation that can now 
unfold, on top of this one.
we come to cybernetics later, as most of us do, it 
contests our conventional ways of doing things. But, 
as well as being challenging, I think that focusing on 
foundational questions can also be accessible. One 
does not need specific prior knowledge to build on. 
Instead, one can explore cybernetics within one’s 
own experience and practice. As you mention, I 
am currently leading a module in design research 
practices.28 It is a taught module taken by all our 
postgraduate students, including those on profes-
sional programmes such as our RIBA Part 2 course. 
I find that design students often see research 
as something ‘other’ than their design practice – 
perhaps as a distinct component or phase of work 
(site analysis, precedent studies) or as something 
that happens in the more explicitly academic parts 
of their study, such as when they write a disserta-
tion. By contrast, from a cybernetic perspective, one 
can think of research as something that has to be 
designed, which means that insights from design 
can contribute to how we understand research 
practice.29 I have usually thought of the benefits 
of this insight as being theoretical – as a way 
to think of design as a discipline in its own terms 
while also allowing for rich connections between 
design and other fields. What I have been trying 
to develop more recently is a way of using this as 
a pedagogical approach. In postgraduate study, 
students are developing their expertise and confi-
dence as designers. By learning to see researching 
as a kind of designing, students’ experience in 
designing can become a foothold for understanding 
research through their own practices, which can be 
empowering.
There are so many ways to do research in 
design, I do not think it makes sense to teach 
methods directly. Instead, we stress that the 
different ways of configuring research processes 
have consequences for the scope and status of 
the insights that are created through them. If I am 
designing my researching, then I need to under-
stand and question the differences that arise from 
designing research in one way rather than another. 
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